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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MISSING LINK: LEAGUE PUNISHMENTS OF TEAM EXECUTIVES
MICHAEL A. MCCANN*
ABSTRACT
Is it lawful for a professional sports league to punish an executive of a team
when that executive isn’t employed by the league and, unlike a player, isn’t a
member of a union that collectively bargains with the league?
The answer to this question has long been presumed as “yes,” despite the
non-employing league lacking a contractual link to the executive—a third
party—it fines, suspends, or even bans from employment with businesses owned
by others.
This Article challenges that presumption. It does so by applying employment
law, franchise law, and private association law to the unique relationship
between sports leagues and their independently owned franchises. The Article
balances the absence of a contractual relationship with league interests in fair
play and orderly structure.
To date, this topic has been overlooked in legal scholarship. Yet it is timely
given recent high-profile punishments of team executives in several of the major
leagues.

* Director of the Sports and Entertainment Law Institute and Professor of Law, University of New
Hampshire Franklin Pierce School of Law; Legal Analyst and Senior Writer, Sportico; On-Air
Legal Analyst, NBA TV. The author would like to thank his colleagues for reviewing drafts and
offering suggestions and Kara McCann and Willa McCann for their support and inspiration.
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INTRODUCTION
Professional sports leagues in the United States routinely suspend, fine, or
even bar executives of independently owned teams. Leagues undertake these
actions despite lacking a contractual relationship with those whom they punish.
This is a unique practice in the American workforce. While employers, often in
accordance with workplace or collectively bargained policies, can take adverse
actions against workers, third parties are normally without standing to affect
such measures.
Sports leagues operate differently. As joint ventures, leagues are expected
to maximize the collective interests of teams, even if doing so harms the interests
of one team or, by extension, one person who works for a team. Such a
framework has generally received support by courts, though usually in the
context of agreements signed by players, owners, or teams. Team executives, in
contrast, do not enter into those league-wide or team-to-team agreements. Their
employment interests are also owed to employing teams rather than the league
at-large.
This Article undertakes a “first of its kind” exploration into the idiosyncratic
phenomenon of league punishments of team executives. It does so mainly
through the lens of employment law, franchise law, and private association law,
and by drawing attention to the distinct features of sports leagues. This Article
concludes by attempting to resolve legally problematic tensions endemic in a
non-employer punishing a third party for employment-related transgressions.
I. COMPETING APPLICATIONS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND LEAGUE
GOVERNANCE
When the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) fined Philadelphia
76ers President of Basketball Operations Daryl Morey $50,000 in 2020 over an
automated tweet, the league’s explanation made sense within the context of rule
administration. 1 The tweet, which Morey deleted within minutes of publication,
praised the accomplishments of a player, Houston Rockets Star James Harden,
whom the 76ers eyed in a trade. 2 The league’s prohibition against tampering
contemplates a strict liability scheme: any attempt, no matter how trivial and
irrespective of intent, to solicit a person who is under contract with another team

1. NBA fines Daryl Morey $50K for Violating Anti-tampering Rule, NBA (Dec. 28, 2020,
2:20 PM), https://www.nba.com/news/nba-fines-daryl-morey-50k-for-violating-anti-tamperingrule (explaining that Morey had been fined).
2. Michael McCann, Morey Tampering Fine for Automated Tweet Finds No Sympathy in
NBA Rules, SPORTICO (Dec. 28, 2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2020/
daryl-morey-james-harden-1234619205/.
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is prohibited. 3 From that lens, even an unintended tweet extolling another team’s
player justified punishment.
Left undiscussed was the fiduciary relationship—or lack thereof—between
the NBA and Morey. How could a sports league sanction a person who is neither
employed by that league nor a member of any relevant bargaining unit? Unlike
an NBA employee, who is paid by the NBA, an NBA player, who is employed
by a team but represented by a union that negotiates working conditions with the
league, or a team owner, who contractually assents to certain league authorities,
Morey’s employer is the 76ers. He is not a member of a union, and the NBA
doesn’t employ him. 4 His employment duties are captured in his 76ers’ contract
and the team’s workplace policies—and they are owed to his employer, not third
parties. The NBA can neither hire Morey as a 76ers employee nor fire him in
that capacity. 5
The Morey example is not unique to the NBA or to professional sports. In
2014, the NBA fined Toronto Raptors General Manager Masai Ujiri $25,000 for
screaming “F--- Brooklyn” in front of Raptors fans before the team would play
the Brooklyn Nets. 6 Not long earlier, the Women’s National Basketball
Association (“WNBA”) fined Minnesota Lynx Cheryl Reeve for throwing her
jacket at an assistant coach during a game. 7 A couple of years ago, Major League
Baseball (“MLB”) suspended former Houston Astros General Manager Jeff
Luhnow for his role in the team’s electronic sign-stealing scandal. 8 The Astros
also fired Luhnow, who in turn sued the Astros for breach of contract. 9 Most
recently, the National Hockey League (“NHL”) suspended former Arizona
Coyotes General Manager John Chayka through 2021. 10 Chayka’s infraction
3. Constitution & By-laws, NBA, at 47, 50–51 (Sept. 2019), https://ak-static.cms.nba.com/
wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2019/09/NBA-Constitution-By-Laws-September-2019-1.pdf
[hereinafter NBA Constitution].
4. Collective Bargaining Agreement, NBA, at 339 (July 2017), https://cosmic-s3.imgix
.net/3c7a0a50-8e11-11e9-875d-3d44e94ae33f-2017-NBA-NBPA-Collective-BargainingAgreement.pdf.
5. See NBA Constitution, supra note 3, at 46 (allowing teams to operate in accordance with
their own business judgment in situations where a rule is not provided by the Constitution or its
Bylaws).
6. Ben Golliver, NBA Fines Raptors GM Masai Ujiri for Cursing Brooklyn, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.si.com/nba/2014/04/21/masai-ujiri-warned-nba-finetoronto-raptors-gm-brooklyn.
7. David Woods, New Name on Jerseys, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 20, 2012, at C8.
8. Nathaniel Grow & Scott J. Shackelford, The Sport of Cybersecurity: How Professional
Leagues can Better Protect the Competitive Integrity of their Games, 61 B.C. L. REV. 473, 507
(2020).
9. Michael McCann, Luhnow Sues Astros to Keep Lid on Scandal, SPORTICO (Nov. 10,
2020), https://www.sportico.com/law/analysis/2020/astros-gm-luhnow-sues-team-1234616376/.
10. Sean Leahy, NHL Reportedly Suspends Ex-Coyotes GM John Chayka for Rest of Year,
NBC SPORTS (Jan. 25, 2021), https://nhl.nbcsports.com/2021/01/25/nhl-reportedly-suspends-excoyotes -gm-john-chayka-for-rest-of-year/.
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was the manner in which he quit his job with the Coyotes. 11 NHL Commissioner
Gary Bettman regarded Chyaka’s behavior as “conduct detrimental to the
league.” 12 The suspension prohibits any NHL team from employing Chayka. 13
The uniqueness of this punishment schema is apparent when comparing it
to analogous workplace settings. Consider a university that disciplines a law
school professor. 14 The professor reports to his or her law school dean, and the
professor’s duties and responsibilities are generally set and enforced by the law
school rather than the university at large. 15 In that vein, the professor might be
akin to a general manager of a team, rather than a league worker. That debatable
resemblance breaks down upon closer review. Ordinarily, the professor’s formal
employer is the university or university system, not the law school. 16 The
professor’s capacity to advance in rank is also usually contingent on university
provost and trustee support. 17 Alternatively, consider when the White House, on
behalf of the President of the United States, directs or urges remedial measures
against persons who work for federal agencies. 18 In a sense, the White House is
functioning like a league, with agencies as teams. But when assessing the role
of punishment, this parallel doesn’t withstand scrutiny. For one, there are wellestablished legal limits to the President’s ability to sanction or replace agency
employees. 19 For another, the agency employee is not employed by a separate

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Leonora LaPeter & Gary Fineout, New Allegation Brings Professor a
Suspension, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, June 12, 1998, at 1 (discussing Florida State’s suspension
of a law professor over alleged misconduct with a student and detailing how the university would
investigate him).
15. See, e.g., Memo. of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at
7–8, Fletcher v. Columbia Univ., No. 152759/2017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 23, 2017) (explaining how
law school administration establishes the professor’s duties); see also Julianne Basinger et al.,
Suspended Law Professor Loses Tenured Job, CHRON. HIGHER ED., May 9, 2003, at A10
(discussing a law school covering teaching assignments of a professor who became unavailable).
16. See Memo. of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, supra
note 15 at 2.
17. See Claire R. Rollor, Narrowing the Gender Pay Gap by Providing Equal Opportunity:
The Need for Tenured Female Professors in Higher STEM Institutions in an Effort to Recast
Gender Norms, 21.2 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 143, 151–52 (2014) (explaining how a professor’s
ability to gain tenure is normally contingent on approval by the provost and university trustees).
18. Erich Wagner, White House Advisor Sought Legal Opinion to Allow Trump to Fire Anyone
In Government, GOVT. EXEC. (June 25, 2020), at https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/06/
white-house-advisor-sought-legal-opinion-trump-can-fire-anyone-government/166445/.
19. Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1755, 1773–74 (2013) (distinguishing the President and agencies as entities and noting that the
President’s ability to take action against agency leaders and employees varies based on the
classification of the position and type of agency).
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ownership group, like a general manager of a team—the employee works for the
federal government, just like the President himself or herself. 20
Leagues’ ability to sanction non-unionized employees of individual
franchises stems from the contractual relationship between franchises and their
employees. Employment contracts between teams and their executives contain
language requiring executives to accept league discipline. 21 For instance, in the
NBA, executives assent to Article 35A of the league constitution, a document
that governs the legal relationship between franchises and the league. 22 Article
35A is expressed as governing teams’ non-player employees. 23 Teams are
obligated to “provide and require in every contract with any of its owners,
officers, managers, coaches or other employees that they should be bound and
governed by the Constitution.” 24 Article 35A further allows the commissioner
to impose a fine of up to $5 million and a suspension of a length of the
commissioner’s for any conduct the commissioner finds is “conduct prejudicial
or detrimental to the Association.” 25 The decision of the commissioner is also
“final, binding, conclusive, and unappealable.” 26
MLB adopts a similarly dictatorial approach. Under Article VI of the
league’s constitution, all contracts between MLB clubs and their officers and
employees “shall contain a clause by which the parties agree to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and to accept the
Commissioner’s decisions rendered in accordance with this Constitution.” 27
Mindful of the possibility of attempts to contract around Article VI and other
provisions, Article VII declares that the constitution “shall supersede any
conflicting provisions of any other agreement, as amended, whether now
existing or hereinafter entered into, to which any Major League Club is a party
and any conflicting actions taken pursuant thereto.” 28 MLB has used league rules
20. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations,
1787–1801, 115 YALE L. J. 1256, 1303 (discussing the origins of federalizing executive branch
officials).
21. NBA Constitution, supra note 3, at 6.
22. See Riko Enters., Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“The NBA constitution is a contract between the member teams of the NBA.”); see also Desir v.
Spano, 259 A.D.2d 749, 749 687 N.Y.S.2d 411, 411 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (“The constitution and
by-laws of an unincorporated association express the terms of a contract which define the privileges
secured and the duties assumed by those who have become members.”).
23. See NBA Constitution, supra note 3, at 48 (noting “the provisions” shall apply to
“employees, agents or representatives of a Member [franchise] or Owner”).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 49.
26. Id. at 52.
27. See Major League Const., art. VI, § 3 (2005), https://ipmall.law.unh.edu/sites/default/
files/hosted_resources/SportsEntLaw_Institute/League%20Constitutions%20&%20Bylaws/ML
ConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf [http://perma.cc/L2VA-6MU4] [hereinafter MLB Constitution].
28. Id. at art. VII.
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to punish team employees. 29 Most famously, MLB expelled Cincinnati Reds
manager Pete Rose from any relationship with the league or its teams as a
penalty for alleged violations of an anti-betting rule. 30 The willingness of
leagues to regulate teams’ employees with whom they lack an employment or
labor relationship exhibits selective timing. Leagues play only bounded roles in
teams’ hiring of executives. 31 There are no league-mandated eligibility
requirements for coaches or general managers. 32 Likewise, the league doesn’t
participate in job interviews or hold veto power over teams’ hiring choices. 33
One partial exception: ensuring a diverse applicant pool. For example, the NFL’s
“Rooney Rule” requires that teams interview minority candidates and, by
dangling additional draft picks, rewards teams that draw from diverse applicant
pools. 34 MLB utilizes a similar, albeit less commanding policy, dubbed the
“Selig Rule.” 35 It requires teams to “consider,” though not interview, female or
minority candidates for front office and on-field positions. 36 Still, teams’
decisions on who to hire is ultimately up to those teams.
League officials also sometimes exhibit caution at the prospect of punishing
team employees. After coaches and general managers criticized NHL referees
in 1978, the NHL demurred on issuing reprimands. 37 The world’s top hockey
league reasoned that team owners are responsible for policing their own
employees. 38 Until the last two decades, leagues also refrained from instituting
rules that, under threat of penalty, compel teams to follow health protocols
designed to mitigate the risk of neurological trauma. 39 Even in instances where
29. See Kendall Howell, You Can Bet On It: The Legal Evolution of Sports Betting, 11 HARV.
J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 73, 75 (explaining the Pete Rose scandal and its aftermath).
30. Id. at 75–80.
31. Jeff Zillgitt, NBA Nears Record with New Black Coaching Hires: ‘The Last Few Weeks
Have Been Really Cool’, USA TODAY (updated July 29, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/nba/2021/07/28/seven-hires-nba-nears-record-number-black-coaches/5374290001/.
32. Id.
33. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Accountability as a Debiasing Strategy: Testing the Effect of
Racial Diversity in Employment Committees, 103 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1631 (2018) (explaining that
“in the context of the NFL, for example, most head coach hiring decisions are made by some
combination of the team’s owner, presidents, vice presidents, and general managers.”).
34. James Wagner, Hailed as a Trailblazer, Ng Still Stands Alone, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2021,
at B7.
35. Nathaniel Grow, MLB Announces New Minority Hiring Initiative, FANGRAPHS (Aug. 17,
2015), https://blogs.fangraphs.com/mlb-announces-new-minority-hiring-initiative/.
36. Id.
37. Parton Keese, N.H.L. Focused on Boe, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 1978), https://www.ny
times.com/1978/06/13/archives/nhl-focuses-on-boe-some-progressbut-canadiens-trophy-leaderstoo.html; James Christie, Islander Debts Under Discussion at NHL Meetings, GLOBE & MAIL, June
12, 1978 (Can.).
38. Christie, supra note 37.
39. Colin Fly, APNewsBreak: NBA Mulling Formal Concussion Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Mar. 9, 2011.
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leagues punish teams for failure to adhere to health protocols, those punishments
are levied on the teams themselves, rather than the infringing employees. 40
II. LEAGUES AS PRIVATE ASSOCIATION JOINT VENTURES
The relationship between leagues and teams’ officials stems from the
connection between leagues and their teams. Courts have regarded pro leagues
where teams are independently owned as joint ventures. 41 These are associations
“of two or more persons formed to carry out a single business enterprise for
profit for which purpose they combine their property, money, efforts, skill,
and/or knowledge.” 42 Sports leagues operate at the collective behest of teams,
whose owners elect the commissioner and can fire him or her. 43 At the same
time, the commissioner enjoys sizable authority over teams and is bestowed with
final say on matters impacting the league. 44 Indeed, laws governing private
associations empower the commissioner and other league officials to act akin to
a chief executive officer and corporate boards. 45 Courts usually accord such
associations deference in decision-making and rule-making, so long as such
activities are not arbitrary or fraudulent. 46 To illustrate, in Atlanta National
League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, a federal court ruled that while a league

40. Ken Belson, N.F.L. Introduces New Rules to Back Concussion Protocol, N.Y. TIMES, July
26, 2016, at B13.
41. See, e.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 520 Fed. Appx. 61 (3d Cir.
2013) (describing the NBA as a joint venture); Williams v. Nat’l Football League, 598 F.3d 932,
933 (8th Cir. 2009) (calling the NFL a joint venture). There are other types of pro sports leagues,
including single entity leagues where the league owns all of the teams and directly employs players,
coaches and other staff. See generally, Nathaniel Grow, There’s No “I” in “League”: Professional
Sports Leagues and the Single Entity Defense, 105 MICH. L. REV. 183, 185–87, 189 (2006)
(explaining there are other types of pro sports leagues, including single entity leagues where the
league owns all the teams and directly employs players, coaches and other staff).
42. 46 AM. JUR. 2D Joint Ventures § 1 (2017).
43. Michael J. Willisch, Protecting the “Owners” of Baseball: A Governance Structure to
Maintain the Integrity of the Game and Guard the Principals’ Money Investment, 88 NW. U. L.
REV. 1619, 1620–21 (1994); see also Hal McCoy, Firing Vincent was Step by Owners Toward
Strike, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 15, 1994, at 4C (discussing the “firing” of MLB
commissioner Faye Vincent).
44. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc. v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 1978) (explaining
history of the commissioner in baseball and how the position enjoys authority outside of ownership
groups and is designed to ensure control over the sport itself).
45. Marc Edelman, Are Commissioner Suspensions Really Any Different from Illegal Group
Boycotts? Analyzing Whether the NFL Personal Conduct Policy Illegally Restrains Trade, 58
CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 634 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Milwaukee Am. Ass’n v. Landis, 49 F.2d 298, 301–03 (N.D. Ill. 1931) (holding
commissioner has substantial latitude to void a transaction between teams in order to protect the
best interests of the league when such voidance is not arbitrary or fraudulent); see also Note, Out
of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1060
(discussing the latitude courts generally afford commissioners).
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commissioner could punish an owner for commenting on another team’s
pending free agents in violation of a tampering rule, stripping the owner’s team
of a first-round pick was arbitrary since it was not listed by relevant rules as a
possible penalty. 47
Courts have also thought of leagues as franchisors and teams as
franchisees. 48 This label works on several levels. One is that leagues, like
franchisors, establish rules and policies that each team (franchise) must follow
in order to advance collective interests. 49 To that end, both leagues and typical
franchisors, such as fast food and retail chains, require teams/franchisees to
follow operations manuals. 50 These manuals are designed to ensure consistency
in presentation and experience. 51 Such policies might, for instance, specify the
number of towels and soft drinks home teams must provide visiting teams or the
temperature at which a fast food restaurant’s burgers are grilled. 52 Teams and
franchises are similar in regard to individual ownerships that act as “part of the
cooperative enterprise.” 53
Yet, there are crucial distinctions between pro leagues and franchisors. For
example, while leagues feature salary caps that limit the dollar amounts teams
can spend on players—including, in some leagues, maximum salaries 54—
franchisors typically reserve wage and salary decisions to individual
franchises. 55 Teams also directly compete in myriad ways that are unique to the

47. 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1222–26 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
48. Am. Needle, Inc. v. New Orleans La. Saints, 385 F. Supp. 2d. 687, 696 (N.D. Ill. 2005);
see also Cont’l Basketball Ass’n v. Ellenstein Enters., Inc., 640 N.E.2d 705, 706 (Ind. App. 1994)
(describing the Continental Basketball Association as a franchisor that sells franchises or member
clubs).
49. Cont’l Basketball Ass’n, 640 N.E.2d at 708.
50. Nicolas Saenz, Sports Franchise Bankruptcy: A New Way For Team Owners To Escape
League Control?, 10 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 63, 70–73 (2010).
51. See Ferrer v. Jewelry Repair Enters., 310 So.3d 428, 429 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). (noting
that franchises value “uniform standardization of products and services” and the relationship with
franchisees “contemplates regular and ongoing support from the franchisor”).
52. Samuel J. Horovitz, If You Ain’t Cheating You Ain’t Trying: “Spygate” and the Legal
Implications of Trying Too Hard, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 305, 318 (2009); Doreen Hemlock,
Whopping Winners, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, May 5, 1998; James W. Denison, Why It’s Tough to
have Hard-and-Fast Rules about Operations Manuals, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 239, 241 (2011).
53. Saenz, supra note 50, at 71.
54. Scott R. Rosner, Conflicts of Interest and the Shifting Paradigm of Athlete Representation,
11 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 193, 244 (2004); see also Richard A. Kaplan, The NBA Luxury Tax Model:
A Misguided Regulatory Scheme, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1615, 1626 (2004) (discussing the NBA’s
use of maximum salaries for rookies).
55. Kate Taylor, McDonald’s Is Raising Employees’ Wages, But Only at Corporate Locations,
ENTREPRENEUR (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/244641; see also Ruben
Alan Garcia, Modern Accountability for a Modern Workplace: Reevaluating the National Labor
Relations Board’s Joint Employer Standard, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 741, 746–47 (discussing
limited impact of McDonalds’ raising wages).
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sports industry and distinguishable from the typical franchisor-franchisee
relationship. Most obviously, they battle on the field, court, and rink. Teams also
contend in ancillary components of “in-game” competition, such as in drafting
amateur players, signing players, and recruiting coaches and scouts. 56
While teams compete, they also collaborate, sometimes out of necessity.
They must agree on game rules and scheduling, or a competitive game between
two teams would be impossible. 57 While not essential to the playing of organized
games, teams’ acceptance of league-wide economic restraints, such as agreedupon deadlines and restrictions, help to create an orderly system for
competition. 58 Likewise, teams prefer to assign certain authorities to a neutral
party: the commissioner. 59 The role of the commissioner is thought to have
begun in the late 19th century with the rise of the National League—considered
the first “true” major professional league. 60 The league was initially run by a
board, which eventually hired coal magnate William Hulbert to lead
operations. 61 Hulbert would spark controversy, including by banning players for
fixing games and even expelling a team, the Cincinnati Red Stockings, for
playing games and serving beer on Sundays. 62 Over the next century other
commissioners would adopt the role of the “final arbiter of disputes between
leagues and clubs,” with the goal of seeking remedies for conduct “detrimental
to the best interests” of the league. 63 To that end, commissioners would receive
56. See Sullivan v. Nat’l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091, 1098 (1st Cir. 1994) (“it is well
established that NFL clubs also compete with each other, both on and off the field, for things like
fan support, players, coaches, ticket sales, local broadcast revenues, and the sale of team
paraphernalia.”); see also, Los Angeles Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726
F.2d 1381, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that teams in the same geographic market compete for
fans).
57. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 202 (2010) (distinguishing that
NFL teams “must cooperate in the production and scheduling of games”). While teams must
conspire, they must also bargain numerous wage, hour, and other workplace rules with players’
associations in order to gain protection of the non-statutory labor exemption. The exemption
immunizes leagues from scrutiny of Section I of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See Gabe Feldman,
Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS
LAW 209, 216–17 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2018).
58. Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 201 (explaining that individual teams share a common
interest in the league operating as a profitable enterprise).
59. Nat’l Hockey League Players’ Ass’n v. Bettman, No. 93 Civ. 5769 (KMW), 1994 WL
738835, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1994) (discussing how team owners created position of the
commissioner and responsibilities).
60. Jimmy Golen & Warren K. Zola, The Evolution of the Power of the Commissioner in
Professional Sports in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 19, 21 (Michael A.
McCann ed., 2018).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 22.
63. Matthew B. Pachman, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional Sports
Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose Controversy,
76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990).
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authorities guided by a “broad mandate to preserve fundamental aspects of
fairness” of their leagues, including in regard to preventing cheating and
untoward influences from gamblers. 64
These authorities are normally captured in the league constitution, which is
typically joined by bylaws. 65 All of the teams within a league sign this document
and assent to be bound by its terms. 66 Leagues are obliged to act within the terms
of the constitution when issuing punishments. 67 This was apparent early in the
development of professional sports leagues. In 1919, a New York court issued
an injunction against Bryon Johnson, president of MLB’s American League,
after the Boston Red Sox sued Johnson for acting outside the scope of his
powers. 68 Johnson had suspended Red Sox Pitcher Carl Mays for desertion after
Mays had left the ballpark in the middle of a game. 69 The Red Sox objected to
the suspension and deemed it tantamount to a punishment of the club for which
Johnson lacked the contractual authority to impose. 70 Johnson argued he acted
within a general welfare/best interests of the game provision which gave him the
authority to “to impose fines or penalties, in the way of suspension or otherwise,
upon any manager or player who, in his opinion, has been guilty of conduct
detrimental to the general welfare of the game.” 71 The court sided with the Red
Sox, reasoning that welfare of the game concerns on-field activities, not those
off the field, and therefore Johnson acted beyond the scope of his position’s
authority. 72
Although rare, teams have challenged their own leagues in court over the
parameters of the relationship between franchisor and franchisee. In Madison
Square Garden v. National Hockey League 73 the New York Rangers insisted
that the NHL violated Section I of the Sherman Act by controlling the team’s
official website. 74 The Dallas Cowboys, which sued the NFL in a dispute over
64. Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy,
119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 123–24 (2010).
65. Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes it Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of its
Conduct Policy, the NFL Protects its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1069, 1091–92 (2008).
66. See Olson v. Major League Baseball, 447 F. Supp. 3d 159, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“All of
MLB’s member Clubs have entered into an operating agreement, the Major League Constitution,
pursuant to which all teams agree to be bound by all rules and regulations relating to games”).
67. Am. League Baseball Club of N.Y. v. Johnson, 109 Misc. 138, 138 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1919).
68. Id. at 139–40, 152.
69. Id. at 141.
70. Id. at 143.
71. Id. at 144.
72. Am. League Baseball Club of N.Y., 109 Misc. at 149.
73. Madison Square Garden, L.P. v Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455(LAP), 2008 WL
4547518, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008).
74. Id. The parties settled their dispute in March 2009. See Stipulation and Order of Dismissal,
Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, No. 07 CDCVCD 8455(LAP) (S.D.N.Y.
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the sharing of merchandise revenue, 75 and the Oakland Raiders, which litigated
against the NFL over the team’s relocation plans, 76 are other noteworthy
examples. To be clear, in none of those examples were team employees
sanctioned or otherwise punished by the associated league.
Leagues have also stressed separation from their teams and their employees
when doing so proves legally advantageous. In Cortez v. National Basketball
Ass’n, the NBA successfully argued it was not the proper defendant in an
Americans with Disabilities Act case. 77 A group of hearing-impaired individuals
had sued the league and the San Antonio Spurs. 78 The plaintiffs sought an
injunction that would have required the NBA to offer interpretative and
captioning services at Alamodome, where the Spurs played their home games. 79
The NBA filed a motion to dismiss, maintaining it was neither the operator nor
owner of the facility. 80 The plaintiffs protested, stressing that the production of
NBA games leads the league to possess “profound control” over the venues
where NBA games are played. 81 The federal district court ruled for the NBA,
noting that while the NBA as a franchisor could be held liable as an operator of
places of public accommodation (franchisees’ arenas), the league’s established
control did not extend to arena decisions concerning interpretative and
captioning services. 82
Meanwhile, litigation brought by team employees over workplace disputes
has typically involved the employee and team, rather than the employee and the
league. In 2007, a jury awarded former New York Knicks Executive Anucha
Browne Sanders $11.6 million for sex discrimination and retaliation claims
brought against Madison Square Garden General Manager Isiah Thomas and
Chairman James Dolan. 83 Her complaint made clear she reported to the team’s

Mar. 23, 2009). Currently, the NHL controls websites of the individual teams. See Privacy Policy,
NHL (updated Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.nhl.com/info/privacy-policy.
75. Dallas Cowboys Football Club, Ltd. v. Nat’l Football League Trust, No. 95 CIV. 9426,
1996 WL 601705, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 1996).
76. L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1384–85 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, Nat’l Football League v. Oakland Raiders, Ltd., 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
77. Cortez v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 960 F. Supp. 113, 118 (W.D. Tex. 1997).
78. Id. at 114.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. For instance, the NBA issued thirty-five pages of guidelines to teams on operation of
their facilities. Id. at 115.
82. Id. at 115, 117.
83. Amy Tracy, Note, Athletic Discipline for Non-Sport Player Misconduct: The Role of
College Athletic Department and Professional League Discipline and the Legal System’s Penalties
and Remedies, 9 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254, 261 (2010); see also Browne Sanders v. Madison
Square Garden, L.P., 101 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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president, Steve Mills, and was evaluated by the Knicks, not the NBA. 84 Still,
Browne Sanders served as the Knicks’ primary liaison to the NBA. 85 Moreover,
despite the NBA contractually requiring teams adhere to a sexual harassment
policy, the NBA declined to punish the Knicks—a move that could have
furnished Browne Sanders with grounds to challenge the NBA. 86 She
nonetheless demurred on alleging any liability or wrongdoing on the part of the
league. 87
Similarly, much of the litigation brought by NFL cheerleaders over alleged
pay discrimination and hostile work environments has been directed against
teams and their ownership groups, rather than the league itself. 88 The underlying
logic is that teams, as opposed to the league, are responsible for the cheerleaders’
pay, workplace conditions and protections, and duties under employee
handbooks. 89 In Jaclyn S. v. Buffalo Bills, members of the Buffalo Jills—the
Bills’ cheerleading squad—sued the team alleging it failed to pay minimum
wage as required by New York labor law. 90 The Bills maintained the
cheerleaders were employed by a third party that provided cheerleading services
to the Bills. 91 Analogous arguments were raised in Lacy T. v. Oakland Raiders. 92
There, former members of the Raiderettes alleged the team had failed to pay
minimum wages, overtime compensation, reimbursement for business expenses,
and meal and rest breaks. 93

84. Complaint at 5, Browne Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., 101 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (No. 06 CV 00589MSG).
85. Id.
86. See Tracy, supra note 83, at 262 (explaining how the NBA declined to punish the Knicks
or any of its employees).
87. Complaint, supra note 84, at 1.
88. See, e.g., Prince v. Madison Square Garden, 427 F. Supp. 2d 372, 375–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(cheerleader for the New York Rangers sued Madison Square Garden over alleged unwelcomed
sexual advances and harassment); First Amended Class Action Complaint at 2, Brenneman v.
Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 2014 WL 548864 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-136); see also Heylee
Bernstein, Cheerleaders in the NFL: Employment Conditions and Legal Claims, 10 HARV. J. OF
SPORTS & ENT. L. 239, 240 (2019) (discussing cheerleader litigation brought against individual
teams).
89. See Bernstein, supra note 88, at 252–54.
90. Jaclyn S. v. Buffalo Bills, Inc., No. 804088-2014, 2014 WL 3700677, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
July 1, 2014).
91. Id.
92. Lacy T. v. Oakland Raiders, No. A144707, 2016 WL 7217584, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
13, 2016).
93. Id. The class action would end in a $1.25 million settlement. See For N.F.L. Cheerleaders,
Rigid Rules Start to Grate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2018, at SP4. Note that cheerleader litigation has
not been limited to the NFL. In Prince v. Madison Square Garden, 427 F. Supp. 2d 372, 377
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), cheerleaders for the New York Rangers NHL club sued over hostile work
environment. The case would settle out of court. See Susan Schultz Laluk & Sharon P. Stiller,
Employment Law, 58 SYRACUSE L. REV. 955, 974 (2008).
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There have been exceptions, with aggrieved team employees or would-be
team employees suing the league. However, plaintiffs in those cases have
pleaded conspiracies against leagues and teams, as opposed to individualized
misconduct by the league. In Kelsey K. v. NFL Enterprises, a group of former
NFL cheerleaders sued the league and its teams on the theory that they colluded
to suppress wages for cheerleaders employed by teams. 94 United States District
Judge William Alsup dismissed the lawsuit on grounds the complaint failed to
allege facts “supporting a plausible inference that the defendants entered into
any agreement or conspiracy to unlawfully restrain trade.” 95 The NFL is also
named as a defendant in Caitlin Ferrari et al. v. National Football League &
Buffalo Bills, Inc. 96 In that ongoing case, former cheerleaders acknowledge the
NFL is not their employer but assert “derivative claims of aiding and abetting”
against the league for its influence on cheerleader salaries. 97 Meanwhile, in the
context of disability law, former NBA Player Roy Tarpley sued the league and
a team (the Dallas Mavericks) over his assertion that exclusion from the league
on the basis of a lifetime ban constituted a violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. 98 Tarpley, who played for the Mavericks until his banishment
for violating league alcohol and drug policies, reached a settlement with the
NBA and Mavericks before a federal court issued substantive rulings. 99
III. LESSONS FROM FRANCHISE LITIGATION
The lack of relationship between franchisors and employees of franchisees
has furnished a valuable defense to franchisors. 100 Such dynamic highlights how
franchisors view franchise employees as outsiders—a stark contrast from how
sports leagues regard franchise employees as within their scope of authority.
This framework was evidenced in Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza. 101 There,
the California Supreme Court refused to hold a franchisor liable for possible
sexual harassment in the workplace of a franchisee. 102 An employee of a
94. Kelsey K. v. NFL Enterprises, LLC, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1140, 1142–43 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
95. Id. at 1148.
96. 153 A.D.3d 1589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
97. Brief for Defendant-Appellant National Football League at 1, Ferrari v. Nat’l Football
League, 153 A.D.3d 1589 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (No. 804125/2014).
98. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 4, 6, Tarpley v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n , No. 4:07-cv03132 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2007); see also Michael A. McCann, Do You Believe He Can Fly?
Royce White and Reasonable Accommodations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act for NBA
Players with Anxiety Disorder and Fear of Flying, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 397, 419–22 (2014) (analyzing
Tarpley’s litigation).
99. Former NBA Players Settles Disability Lawsuit, TORONTO STAR (Mar. 17, 2009),
https://www.thestar.com/sports/basketball/2009/03/16/former_nba_player_settles_disability_law
suit.html.
100. Jay Hewitt, Franchisor Direct Liability, 30 FRANCHISE L.J. 35, 41 (2010).
101. 333 P.3d 723, 726 (Cal. 2014).
102. Id. at 743.
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Domino’s Pizza franchise sued Dominos, arguing it was vicariously liable for
alleged sexual harassment by another employee of that same franchise. 103
Domino’s stressed that the standards it imposes on franchisees pertain to selling
its trademarked pizza and meeting customer expectations that they “received a
similar experience each time they patronized any franchised store.” 104 In terms
of selection and management of franchises’ employees, Dominos insisted it
reserved those responsibilities to individual franchises. 105 The court was
convinced, concluding that “[n]o reasonable inference could be drawn” to intuit
Domino’s retained control over the franchisee with respect to day-to-day aspects
of the franchisee’s workplace—including in terms of hiring, supervision,
discipline, and firing. 106 Similarly, in Nickola v. 7-Eleven, Inc., a franchisor
persuaded a court that because it neither controlled hiring practices nor directed
the relevant type of work, it ought to be severed from a litigation. 107 The case
involved a 7-Eleven customer who was injured when an employee spilled hot
coffee on the customer’s head during an altercation with another customer
regarding the coffee’s preparation. 108 While the franchisor had provided
operations training to franchisees, those franchisees weren’t mandated to follow
recommendations and could instead supervise employees as they saw fit. 109
Although the lack of privity between franchisee employees and the
franchisor can advantage the franchisor in litigation, that dynamic also creates
administrative and enforcement hurdles for franchisors. As Professors Robert
W. Emerson and Lawrence J. Trautman have written, a franchisor “monitoring
a franchisee can become a complicated web of legal strands.” 110 The franchisor
can turn to the franchise agreement and explore potential contractual options,
but in some instances the agreement doesn’t contemplate applicable procedures
or remedies. 111 Franchisors and franchisees might then pursue litigation,
103. Id. at 727.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 727–28; see also Andrew Elmore, The Future of Fast Food Governance, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 73, 80 (2017) (discussing how franchises characterize their control of franchisees
as consistent with quality control, rather than day-to-day operational management).
106. Patterson, 333 P.3d. at 742; see also Deepa Das Acevedo, Invisible Bosses for Invisible
Workers, or Why the Sharing Economy is Actually Minimally Disruptive, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
35, 52 (2017) (explaining the legal significance of a franchisor possessing control over human
resources and related practices).
107. Nickola v. 7-Eleven Inc., No. 03–13494, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4126, at *7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Oct. 2, 2006).
108. Id. at *2–3.
109. Id. at *4–5; see also Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford, 648 So. 2d 119, 120 (Fla. 1995)
(holding Mobil Oil not liable after a customer sued over injuries sustained in an altercation with an
employee of a franchisee).
110. Robert W. Emerson & Lawrence J. Trautman, Lessons about Franchise Risk from Yum
Brands and Schlotzsky’s, 24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 997, 1008 (2020).
111. Id.
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arbitration, or mediation. 112 For instance, in Zeidler v. A&W Restaurants, Inc.,
an A&W franchisee sued the franchisor for breach. 113 The franchisee had closed
in the wake of the franchisor warning the franchisee that it had failed to follow
company health and sanitation standards. 114 The franchisee averred,
unsuccessfully, that the franchisor’s threats made it impracticable to run a
profitable business. 115
Outside of the sports context, the record is bereft of franchisors firing,
suspending, or fining franchisee employees. 116 In fact, when franchisors attempt
to impose such a sanction, they can run afoul of the law. In Smith v. Ford Motor
Company, the franchisor was held liable for “wrongfully exert[ing] pressure” on
the franchisee, a local car dealership, to disassociate itself from the dealership’s
president and general manager. 117 Ford Motors was found to have engaged in
“wrongful, malicious and unlawful interference” in the employment relationship
between the dealership and the employee. 118 Franchisors can also face litigation
when they attempt to mediate employee-related disputes among franchisees. In
Pearse v. McDonald’s, a former manager of one McDonald’s franchise who was
recruited by a second sued McDonald’s. 119 He persuaded a trial court that
McDonald’s had illegally interfered with his employment relationship. 120
McDonald’s had warned the second franchisee that it was in violation of
franchise agreement prohibition against poaching employees. 121 To restore
compliance with its franchise agreement, the second franchisee fired the
plaintiff. 122 On appeal, McDonald’s prevailed. 123 The appellate court reasoned
that McDonald’s interests in maintaining a “unified operation of its system” and
in preventing “impairment to its operating agreements” outweighed the
plaintiff’s interests “in being free from the interference of job changing between
franchisees.” 124 Still, the litigation highlighted the thorny landscape for
franchisors to regulate franchisees’ employment matters. 125

112. Id.
113. 301 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2002).
114. Id. at 573–74.
115. Id.
116. A thorough examination of case law, as well as conversations with franchise attorneys,
yielded not one example of a franchisor taking direct against the employee of a franchise.
117. 221 S.E.2d 282, 284 (N.C. 1976).
118. Id.
119. 351 N.E.2d 788, 789 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
120. Id. at 789–90.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 793.
124. Pearse, 351 N.E.2d at 792.
125. See Andrele Brutus St. Val, No-Hire Provisions in McDonald’s Franchise Agreements,
An Antitrust Violation or Evidence of Joint Employer?, 23 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 279,
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That’s not to say franchisors lack leverage or suasion over franchisees with
respect to employees. In a standard franchise agreement, the franchisor
possesses the right to terminate or suspend its relationship should a stipulated
circumstance arise. For instance, a “threat or danger to public safety results from
the construction, maintenance or operation of the franchised business” can
accord the franchisor with an option to end the arrangement. 126 Likewise, a
franchisee that “by act or omission, permits or commits tortious conduct or a
violation of any applicable law, ordinance, rule or governmental regulation . . .
constituting a felony, or constituting a misdemeanor, lesser criminal offense or
a violation of law” can also see its agreement voided. 127 These clauses are
occasionally invoked. In Glenside West Corp. v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., Division of
Exxon Corp., 128 the president of an Exxon franchisee was convicted of a crime
in the aftermath of repeatedly beating a man with a pipe. 129 Exxon ended its
relationship with the franchisee, a decision the court concluded was well within
actions authorized by the franchise agreement. 130
No matter how franchisor-franchisee law and accompanying case precedent
are unpacked, they do not align with sports leagues directly disciplining
employees of privately owned teams. Franchisors, outside of the sports league
context, simply do not punish employees of franchisees. The distinctiveness of
leagues in this context reflects their structure. Professor Stephen Ross explains
that leagues possess a “unique interest in maintaining a significant degree of
competitive balance among the teams within their venture.” 131 To that end,
courts have permitted leagues to restrict and sanction individual franchises to
ensure fair play among them. For instance, in United States v. National Football
League, 132 the court concluded that “it is both wise and essential that rules be
passed to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger ones and
318–19 (2019) (discussing how franchisors’ liability as joint-employers may be impacted by degree
to which a franchisee manager acts as an intermediary between the franchisor and franchisee).
126. Franchise agreement for a pizza chain (on file with author); see also Bryan Arbeit, A
Franchisor’s FLSA Liability for its Franchisee’s Workers: Why Operational Control over
Employment Conditions should make a Franchisor a Joint Employer, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 253, 274 (2015) (noting that franchisors routinely engage in inspections of franchisees to
ensure compliance).
127. See sample franchise agreement on file with author, supra note 126.
128. 761 F. Supp. 1118 (D.N.J. 1991).
129. Id. at 1124.
130. Id. at 1134; see also Thomas J. Walsh III, Supersizing the Definition of Employer under
the National Labor Relations Act: Broadening the Joint-Employer Standard to include Franchisors
and Franchisees, 47 U. TOL. L. REV. 589, 634 (2018) (arguing “franchisors have significant direct
and indirect effects on conditions of employment and have further potential to control other
conditions of employment”).
131. Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and
Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 133,134 (2001).
132. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
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to keep the League in fairly even balance.” 133 The league, the court reasoned,
could prevent the telecasting of a team’s games into the television markets of
other teams when those teams are playing home games. 134 This same logic has
been identified in rulings concerning other leagues. For instance, in Philadelphia
World Hockey Club. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 135 a court identified a
“need for competitive balance within the league” as a justification for upholding
contractual restraints in pro hockey. 136
From that lens, punishments of team officials enable leagues to more
effectively promote competitive balance: team officials are on notice that their
actions are subject to league review and sanction. Given that team owners might
lack the desire to punish their own employees for taking actions designed to
advance their team’s interests—even at the expense of failing to comply with
league rules—the league reserving the right to punish is arguably defensible. 137
In the event a sanctioned executive challenged a league punishment in court on
grounds of an absence of contractual privity, the league would likely insist its
capacity to achieve competitive balance hinges on a capacity to discipline.
CONCLUSION
The ability of professional sports leagues to punish someone who neither
works for the league nor is a member of a bargaining group or management
association in contract with the league tests the limits of employment, franchise,
and private association laws. From the standpoint of institutional design, leagues
possess straight lines to players, owners, and teams, but only dotted ones to
executives of those teams. Leagues attempt to diminish the risk of liability by
requiring teams to incorporate language within employment contracts that
indicates leagues have authority to punish. It remains to be seen if such language
would withstand legal scrutiny given that the executive is not in contract with
the league. A league, however, would possess a rational argument that its ability
to meet essential objectives, including fair play and orderly structure, demands
that commissioners can enforce rules against all persons associated with the
league.

133. Id. at 323.
134. Id. at 326; see also Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. l976)
(finding that the NFL enjoys “has a strong and unique interest in maintaining competitive balance
among its teams.”)
135. 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
136. Id. at 486; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (citing “unique characteristics
and needs” of professional baseball while upholding a longstanding antitrust exemption).
137. See Jason Reid, Will the NFL’s Radical Plan to Increase Minority Hires Work?,
UNDEFEATED, May 16, 2020, at (explaining how “owners won’t punish themselves” and therefore
league and commissioner intervention can be needed to effect policy change).
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